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Footing the Cost
(Of Normative Subjectivism)*
Forthcoming in New Methods in Ethics, eds. Jussi Suikkanen and Antti Kauppinen
Jack Woods
1. Introduction
According to some, there’s rarely sufficient moral reason to interfere with reason-
able adults’ decisions about what to do since our lives are our own. According to
others, there’s often sufficient moral reason to do so since our choices impact on
the welfare of others. And, of course, many of us vacillate between these view-
points over the course of our lives. Many philosophers believe at least one of
these viewpoints must be wrong—and wrong no matter who holds it and where
it’s assessed from. Moreover, many philosophers seem to think that believing
that both could1 be right—believing that some form of normative subjectivism is
true—would undermine the point of normative judgment entirely. Philippa Foot
reports the phenomenon thus:
[subjectivism] may, as I said, appear dangerous and subversive of
morality. We are apt to panic at the thought that we ourselves, or
other people, might stop caring about the things we do care about,
and we feel that the categorical imperative gives us some control over
the situation. (Foot 1972)
*Thanks to Derek Baker, Catharine Diehl, Jessica Isserow, Alex King, Barry Maguire, Erum
Naqvi, Ville Paukkonen, Paolo (Lil’ P) Santorio, Karl Schafer, Lucas Thorpe, Teemu Top-
pinen, Ken Westphal, Go¨zde Yıldırım and audiences at Bog˘azic¸i University and the University
of Helsinki for useful comments. Thanks especially to Jimmy Lenman and Pekka Va¨yrynen who
provided very useful comments in writing this final version. And, finally, thanks to my philosoph-
ical hero, Philippa Foot, for providing inspiration.
1Could how? Stay tuned.
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and anyone who’s taken a serious crack at developing subjectivism knows the re-
action all too well.
The worry is not just that subjectivism is false. It’s that subjectivism (or believing
in it) might be actively harmful to the role that normative judgment plays in struc-
turing our lives, evaluating others, planning our future, and the like. Given that
this kind of complaint is rather woolly, I’ll explore here a precise version: that
somehow the truth or acceptance of subjectivism about normativity undermines
the functional role of normative judgment. If subjectivism doesn’t undermine the
functional role of morality, as I’ll claim, then the putative perniciousness that so
many claim subjectivism brings in its wake is significantly diminished, if not en-
tirely extinguished.
I claim that neither the truth of, nor belief in, subjectivism has deleterious im-
pact on the functional role of normative judgments. There’s no need to panic; at
worst, the majority of the population simply believe falsely. I start by describ-
ing reasonable, yet unabashedly subjectivist positions (§2) and distinguishing two
senses of normative universality (in §3). Evaluative normative universality holds
that normative reasons are invariant under change in context when assessed from
our actual normative standpoint. Ontic normative universality holds that norma-
tive reasons are invariant under change in context when assessed by the norms
grounded in those very contexts.2 I then argue that, for many aspects of the func-
tional role of normativity, the putative costs of normative contingency are typically
due to failures or perceived failures of evaluative normative universality. Yet sub-
jectivism need not—in fact, for some subjects and some contexts, can not—deny
evaluative normative universality.
Subjectivist views are ontically contingent by definition, so I need to show the
costs of accepting ontic normative contingency aren’t onerous. I address four
ways in which ontic contigency might interfere with the functional role of norma-
tive judgment. In (§4-5), I argue that the ontic contingency of our reasons doesn’t
undermine their normative significance for us or for evaluating others. In (§6), I
show that we can make sense of why we engage in normative communication—
at least in many cases—given ontic contingency. (§7) explains how normatively
evaluating hypothetical situations makes sense even given subjectivism. Finally,
2Compare Gibbard’s (1990) distinction of grandoise objectivity from moderate objectivity for
a similar distinction, albeit one in an expressivist context. See also (Lenman 2014) for discussion.
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(§8) addresses whether certain intuitively false counternormative conditionals come
out true on subjectivist views.
Admittedly, there are still features of subjectivism which conflict with intuitions
about normativity. But the arguments and constructions of §4-8 alleviate the
symptoms even if they don’t cure the “disease”. Much of the necessary pallia-
tive work I’ll engage in is inspired by an insight of Foot (1972): our normative
outlooks are robust in the sense that it would take a quite radical departure from
ordinary humanity for our normative outlook to significantly change. Moreover,
even if this isn’t actually true, we believe it, and this belief stabilizes our normative
practice. There’s nothing magical here; just reasonable and plausible optimism
about our similarity with one another.
I won’t argue for the sociological claim directly, but there are good reasons to
believe it: just look around and talk to folks for a while. Jimmy Lenman reports
the thought nicely:
The moral outlook we possess and express in our moral judgements
has a generous measure of built in moral mind-independence. So,
according to the outlook most of us share, the wrongness of killing
wouldn’t change if I stopped disapproving of it. But of course it’s just
our outlook. The moral truths it expresses did not shape its evolu-
tion. It is Man who has shaped the Way, the Way did not shape Man.
(Lenman 2014: 243)
Given this thought, much superficial divergence in normative outlook is really
derivative in the sense that some locally contingent non-normative fact explains
the normative divergence. Typically, on inspection, our more-or-less shared nor-
mative outlook remains unshook.
A complementary point which plays a co-inspirational role comes from Barry
Stroud’s (1965) discussion of Wittgenstein’s Wood Sellers—strange people who
measure amounts of wood by the area instead of volume. Stroud argues that the
way which we actually conceptualize Wittgenstein’s example involves illicitly im-
porting many of our own norms about how to measure. But evaluating such a case
under this presumption does not show that their practices are irrational—it just
shows that the irrationality of measuring wood that way while maintaining the re-
mainder of our measuring norms.3 We need to remember that when we consider
3This also echoes a useful discussion of similar issues by Sharon Street (Street 2009, lessons
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bizarre scenarios we typically take our world with us. So it’s not obvious that our
initial reactions to such cases are probative; no one yet has fleshed out a coun-
ternormative case to the point where we could take it seriously as a challenge to
serious subjectivist views.
Whether it’s at all possible to conceptualize obeying such bizarre conventions
from the inside, so to speak, is extremely fraught.4 This point is somewhat known,
but too infrequently recognized, as endless discussions of Parfit’s (1984) future
tuesday indifference example and frequent opposition to the rationality of Gib-
bard’s (1990) totally coherent Caligula, etc. shows. Recognition of it diminishes
the probative weight of putative counterexamples to normative subjectivism. As
I’ll argue below, this point is dramatized by the fact that we’re quick to conflate
evaluative contingency with ontic contingency when theorizing. This is extremely
problematic when evaluating subjectivist views, given that we subjectivists need
only recognize ontic contingency. Foot and Stroud’s points, in tandem, do yeoman
work in showing that we are far more capable of capturing the functional role and
point of normative discourse than is typically thought.
My aim is to put together a number of existing points about subjectivism and func-
tional role which, collectively, undermine the widespread sense that our normative
judgments must be universal.5 I agree that if we lacked evaluative normative uni-
versality, then we’d have a serious problem. But it’s entirely unclear what the
costs of ontic normative contingency are. This fact strengthens existing cases for
subjectivist views—given, for example, by Foot (1972), Harman (1975), Wong
(1984), Dreier (1990), Wiggins (1998), Sobel (2009), Velleman (2013), Finlay
(2014), among others—by showing that costs of the view are relatively minor.
There’s no need to panic, even though subjectivism is true, even if we believe it.
4-5, 10-11) that we can’t make changes in normative outlook without it spreading throughout the
rest of our normative standpoint.
4Though her target is different, Foot’s (1958) discussion of such examples makes this point
vividly. As she claims, whenever we seem to understand how clasping one’s hands three times
could be basically good, there’s typically a suppressed principle connecting this otherwise point-
less activity to something obviously good like respect.
5Many techniques I use below are known in at least philosophical folklore; nevertheless,
putting them together constitutes a novel treatment of this problem. Among those not otherwise
cited below, the discussion of rigidified value judgments in Lewis (1989) is especially relevant and
useful.
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2. Normative Subjectivism
Subjectivist views, as I understand them, are characterized by an explanatory bi-
conditional like:
We have to reason to ϕ if and only if (and because) A
where A is some condition or state of affairs that is essentially dependent on con-
tingent features of us, our community, our conventions, etc. Note that this bicondi-
tional is universally quantified and the ‘because’ here is meant as full, not partial,
non-causal explanation. This characterization would need refinement to count
as a definition of subjectivism—after all, the conjunction of a non-contingent
normative principle and contingent facts about us shouldn’t necessarily count as
subjectivist—but I’ll leave it at this slightly more intuitive level for now. The ex-
amples and discussion below should suffice to make clear what I have in mind.
Reasonable subjectivist views allow:
It’s correct in some sense to say, of a, that they have reason to ϕ if and
only if and (because) A
where again A is a condition or state of affairs that is essentially dependent on
contingent features of me or my moral community. This means that it’s possible—
though not required—that I, a member of one moral community, can correctly say
of you, a member of another moral community, that you have reason to ϕ even if
you can’t say this of yourself.6 I can correctly condemn the moral practices of an-
other community even if their practice is not correctly condemnable from within.
Not all subjectivist views accept this, but ones which don’t have trouble providing
any kind of universality. We’ll henceforth put them aside as non-starters.
Our grounds for asserting that someone has a reason to ϕ need not be A (though
they might be). Rather, the correctness of our assertion is explained by A, even
if our grounds for asserting it aren’t A. Compare a positivistic picture of the law
where the explanation of why a particular fact is legal is grounded out in the de-
cisions of the salient law-makers and our recognition of these law-makers as law
6For example, Lenman (1999) points out “However, [response-dependency] is consistent with
my insistence that torturing human babies for fun is wrong applying not just to the actual world
but to any world - for it may be part of the substantive content of my moral judgement that this
wrongness is not conditional on my responses.”
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makers. This story about legal validity doesn’t demand, and in fact shouldn’t de-
mand, that when we assert that something is legal, we take the grounds of the
actual explanation as our justification for our assertion. That’s an additional con-
troversial commitment. Similarly, we might think that even though it’s the general
social goodness of relationships that make them good, we can’t cite this fact to our
partners to justify why we’re nice to them.
Subjectivist views come in many varieties: non-quasi-realist expressivism,7 Foot’s
(1972) instrumentalism, Street’s (2010, 2012) Humean constructivism, my quasi-
conventionalism (2016, forthcoming). To focus in, we’ll take the following ac-
count of reasons as our working example—note that it’s intended just as a working
example—of a paradigmatically subjectivist view:
conventionalism: Someone has reason to ϕ in a situation γ just in case
and because they’re directed to ϕ in γ by a system of conventional
norms which governs their potential action.8
This isn’t a claim about the lexical meaning of reasons claims, but one about what
it is for there to be a normative reason for me to do something. Given convention-
alism, suitable shifts in the norms we accept will generate a shift in the normative
facts. However, even given conventionalism, we needn’t endorse claims like “If
our norms permitted dog kicking, kicking dogs would be okay” (see §8). Rather,
qua normative theorist, I endorse the metanormative claim that, if conventional-
ism were correct, then if we were to have accepted norms permitting kicking dogs,
we would have had (from the view of that context) reason to kick dogs.
This metanormative claim is crucially different from a similar sounding norma-
tive claim made from within our perspective. I put to the side here those, like
Blackburn (1998) and Dworkin (1996), who suggest that we cannot make sense
of the metanormative claim. Even if they’re right about the particular metaethical
views they favor, which I strongly doubt, we can make the necessary distinction
for conventionalism.
7Quasi-realist expressivism is more difficult to tackle. See Lenman (2014) for a version of
quasi-realism which is explicitly not realism; others are less forthright.
8This way of articulating conventionalism allows that they could also be directed to refrain
from φ-ing. A full spelling out of this view needs to accommodate differential weights of rea-
sons and directions in order to accommodate our complex normative conventions. We’ll put this
complication aside.
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I won’t chisel down the right-hand side of conventionalism. We should add hedges
to avoid worries having to do with false information, rash approvals, and the like,
but presumably such chiseling can be done.9 I talk in terms of reasons, not obli-
gations, but the arguments work equally either way. I use reasons talk since it’s
increasingly pervasive and we can plausibly recapture obligation-talk in terms of
having most reason. Anyway, though the contours of any actual subjectivist view
will be tremendously complicated, this does not affect the general structural points
I want to make.
For similar reasons, I’ll put aside complicated relationships between moral norma-
tivity and our “thin” reasons to engage in moral behavior. For the sort of structural
points I want to make here, these relationships don’t matter much and my claims
generalize across normative standards down to “thinner” normative notions. If
anything, working with morality stacks the deck against me since it’s exactly in
the case of morality that our fears about deviant normative standards are greatest.
For those wanting a plausible picture of how to merge two types of subjectivism
to accommodate this distinction, I offer my (2016, forthcoming, manuscript) as
examples.
Of course, to fully develop conventionalism as more than an example, I’d need to
give an account of what it is for a conventional system of norms to be in force for
a particular agent, as I do in my (forthcoming). I won’t repeat this story here since
it’s independent of my general claims. If a picture helps, it’s close enough to think
in terms of sophisticated positivism about the law (Hart 1961). I’ll presume that
conventional facts tell us both what reasons we have and what their strength is.
This is a substantial assumption, but, again, it will do for here. Again, the points
made below are general enough to hold regardless of one’s normative topography.
Finally, I have no truck here with metanormative subjectivism where what it is
for there to be a reason at all, moral or otherwise, shifts from context to context,
here being that we favor it, there being that God says that we must do such and
so. That view dances far too close to literal incoherence, as Plato pointed out long
ago. We turn now to distinguishing two senses in which we might think reasons
are universal.
9I’ll likewise not address the distinction between objective and subjective—in the sense of
information-dependent—reasons below. A full account should, but I have no room for epicycles.
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3. Two Notions of Normative Universalism
We may view normative reasons as holding for each other when evaluated at our
own perspective. When you suggest you can ignore starving people and shop ex-
clusively at Waitrose or Whole Foods,10 I draw on my belief that we shouldn’t
harm innocents to persuade you to shop at Aldi’s11 and donate the difference to
Oxfam. If you reject this reason, as it’s no part of your (recognized) normative per-
spective, I still have no reason to revise my opinion that you’re doing something
you’ve significant reason not to. After all, I have strong evidence your normative
beliefs are mistaken: my normative beliefs.12
Call this the evaluative sense of normative universality: that you (or anyone, but
stick with ‘you’ for now) have reason to do something is evaluatively normatively
universal when it holds, no matter what the non-normative facts may be, when
evaluated from our normative perspective. For example, consider a normative
perspective which only cares about utility maximization. For it, “we have reason
to do the thing which is utility maximizing” is evaluatively normatively universal:
no matter what conventions govern a context we evaluate, what matters is whether
the actions performed there are utility maximizing. If their normative viewpoint
tells them to do something which doesn’t maximize utility, they’re simply wrong
(by our lights.)
Alternatively, we may view normative reason claims as holding for each other
even when evaluated even within each other’s perspectives. That is, we may hold
that there’s reason for you to do such and so when evaluated from my context
α, from your context β, or even from any arbitrary context γ. Call this the ontic
sense of normative universality: that we have reason to do something is ontically
normatively universal when it holds no matter what the non-normative facts may
be when evaluated at any normative perspective.13
10Or whatever your local “I’m not one of those people” supermarket is.
11Or whatever your local sensible supermarket is.
12You might think this rather partial and that morality ought to be impartial. But the strong
forms of impartiality which treat all of our beliefs about the normative as on a par can’t be held
coherently with sensible subjectivism, as I pointed out in passing above. See Atiq (2016) for a
more subjectivist friendly account of impartiality.
13This way of distinguishing two notions of reasons is similar to the two-dimensional interpre-
tation of expressivism in (Peacocke 2003). (Schafer 2014a) develops a slightly more general view,
perspectivalism, using the notion of assessor relativism.
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To make this distinction slightly more precise, I’ll introduce some machinery from
Einheuser (2006).14 Let a context be a pair 〈c, n〉 of a circumstance c–here a set of
non-normative descriptive facts—and a system of norms n–here a set of conven-
tions for what we have reason to do. A circumstance is a suitably large fragment
of a possible world—large enough to support a group of agents with particular
behavior indicating acceptance or rejection of a system of norms, systematic ap-
proval and disapproval of various actions, etc.15 A context gives rise to a reason
for an agent a to ϕ in a situation γ when the system of norms n, applied to the
non-normative descriptive facts c, says that a has reason to ϕ in γ. We’ll write this
〈c, n〉 |= R(a, ϕ, γ).16
We say that the system of norms n is grounded by a circumstance c when n is
the system of pure reason facts (those which aren’t dependent on particular non-
normative facts about our perspective) arising from a circumstance c. What it is
for a circumstance to give rise to a system of pure reason facts will depend on the
correct view of metanormativity. Quite generally, we’ll write nc to indicate the
system of norms grounded by c.
This way of proceeding explicates conventionalism, but it doesn’t presuppose it.
If conventionalism is right, then it’s the behaviors and dispositions to accept var-
ious norms as holding (or deferral to a group of people who decide which norms
hold, as in (Hart 1961)) that does the relevant work here by giving rise to a system
of conventions more generally, which in turn gives rise, by means of convention-
alism, to a system of reasons facts. Then the actual circumstance c@ grounds
a system of norms n which says, when applied to the non-normative facts cap-
tured by c@, that we have decisive reasons not to kick dogs since the conventional
practices we accept (by means of our dispositions to accept governing principles
which) rule out kicking dogs. More generally, given conventionalism, our pure
reasons will depend on our circumstances. If, alternatively, a non-subjectivist
view is right, then there will be one set of pure reasons which will be grounded by
any circumstance in some way. So our Einheuserian machinery makes room for,
14The development here is a bit more technical than the rest of the paper: the reader can skip it
and work with the intuitive glosses if they’re allergic to symbols.
15We use fragments of possible worlds to allow that different communities in the same world
may have different normative behaviors. If this annoys, make the simplifying assumption that
there is only one set of behaviors at any context and let a circumstance be a possible world.
16We will often simplify by assuming that a is part of c and that we don’t have to deal with
reasons arising for agents in context where they don’t exist.
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but doesn’t presuppose, subjectivism.
We can vary our actual circumstance c@ and our actual norms nc@ in two ways,
thus obtaining two notions of universality.17 What I’ve called evaluative univer-
sality can be defined easily enough for simple reasons claims:
〈c, n〉 |= eR(a, γ, ϕ) if and only if ∀c
′[a, γ ∈ c′ ⇒ 〈c′, n〉 |= R(a, γ, ϕ)]
That is, a reasons claim R(a, γ, ϕ) is evaluatively universal at a context 〈c, n〉 just
in case a having reason to ϕ in situation γ—R(a, γ, ϕ)—holds at all contexts 〈c′, n〉
which differ from 〈c, n〉 only in circumstance (i.e. non-normative facts) (and where
a and γ still exist).18 That is, when evaluating by the conventional norms n, no
matter what circumstance we look at, a has reason to ϕ in γ.
Extending our definition in the obvious way, we get
〈c, n〉 |= eϕ if and only if ∀c
′〈c′, n〉 |= ϕ
for more complicated reasons claims with embedded occurrences of R. We can
then find non-trivial evaluatively universal claims easily enough.19 Consider “no
one ever has a reason to be cruel merely for fun”. Evaluated by a stringent ver-
sion of our own moral outlook, this seems true no matter what the underlying
non-normative facts are. Note that there is no entailment from subjectivism of the
types described above to cases of evaluative contingency.
We’ll have evaluative contingency only when n’s verdicts depend on which con-
text we’re evaluating. Given conventionalism, this will typically only be the case
when we’ve got cultural relativist or, more plausibly, derivative “when in Rome”
conventions. But many of our actual norms will manifestly not involve the idea
that others have reason to do what their conventions suggest; in fact, we may ac-
tively disapprove of others following their conventions, etc. Anyways, regardless
17The use of  below might suggest that I’m talking about two notions of necessity. My only
objection to this terminology is that it brings in its wake more settled ideology than I’d like.
However, if thinking in terms of necessity and contingency instead of universality and contingency
helps you, feel free.
18I’ll take the restriction that a and γ exists at c′ as understood henceforth.
19There are complexities here that I’m ignoring; e.g. without restrictions on the range of ϕ, our
definition marks various metaphysically necessary non-normative claims as evaluatively universal.
See Woods and Maguire (2017) for related discussion.
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of the contours of our actual conventions, subjectivism is by no means committed
to evaluative contingency.
Defining ontic normative universality is also straightforward:
〈c, n〉 |= oϕ if and only if ∀c
′ 〈c′, nc′〉 |= ϕ
That is, ϕ is ontically universal at a context 〈c, n〉 just in case that it holds in any
context consisting of a circumstance c′ and the norms grounded by c′. Presuming
conventionalism is true, when ϕ holds at the point of view of any context when the
salient norms are those arising from the circumstance of that context. convention-
alism entails the existence of ontic contingency so long as different circumstances
embody different systems of norms—as must be allowed to be the case on any
plausible conventionalist view. Again, remember that the only plausibly universal
reasons claims, in either sense, are pure reasons claims. Otherwise our reasons
are typically held hostage to non-normative facts embodied in the circumstances
of evaluation.
We can expand on our Einheuserian terminology to define two related senses of
reasons. Let us say that a, in their context ca, has an ontic reason to ϕ in γ just in
case 〈ca, nca〉 |= R(a, γ, ϕ). And, fixing a set of norms n, we will say that a has an
evaluative reason to ϕ in γ just in case 〈ca, n〉 |= R(a, d, ϕ). In plainer language, a
has an ontic reason to ϕ in γ just in case the norms governing their context give a
reason to ϕ. And a has an evaluative reason, according to n, to ϕ in γ just in case
n (applied to ca) says a has reason to ϕ in γ.
It’s now easy to see that a’s reason to ϕ in c is ontically universal just in case a has
an ontic reason to ϕ in γ in any context where a and γ exist and a’s reason to ϕ is
evaluatively universal just in case n yields a reason for a to ϕ in γ given any context
c′. Having clarified the distinction between two types of normative universality
and the two related sense of reasons, showing them obviously coherent, we turn
to our central question about normative universality.
4. Normative Universality
Asmentioned above, some theorists claim that treating normative facts as arbitrary
or contingent would disrupt their functional role. Here’s two sources, one old and
one new:
11
if one does not wish to deprive the concept of morality of all truth
and all relation to any possible object whatsoever, then one cannot
dispute that its law is so extended in significance as to be valid not
merely for human beings but for all reasonable beings whatsoever,
and not merely under accidental conditions and with exceptions but
with absolute necessity. . . (Kant 2002, 24)
. . . if normative reasons were indeed relative, then mere reflection
on that fact would suffice to undermine their normative significance.
(Smith 1994, 172)
There are two immediate responses to this. First, one borrowed: Kant seems to
be articulating a brute intuition about the ontic universality of normativity (or, at
least, the moral bit of normativity): It’s categorical and binding on all rational
individuals. But this brute intuition is hard to defend. As Foot (1972) showed, the
categorical form of (moral) normative judgments is insufficient to validate Kant’s
intuition. Obviously contingent etiquette facts likewise have categorical form; it’s
not “respect your elders if you don’t want to be rude”, but “respect your elders!”20
And it seems equally weird to respond to the politeness imperative with “but I
don’t care about politeness” as it does to respond to the moral imperative with
“but I don’t care about morality”.21 But what then justifies the claim that norma-
tive judgments are ontically universal?
Now, one blue: Difference in conventional morality is simply a fact of life and
one non-theory driven ordinary moralizers have learned to live with. Diversity
in prudential opinion is likewise fairly common; risk aversion comes in different
levels, as do views about what a good life consists in and how to best care for
ourselves. Even diversity in epistemic norms is rife and sometimes intuitive (just
think of various inductive rules and standards of statistical significance we might
adopt). Reflecting on this fact doesn’t undermine the normative significance of
our views of risk, morality, and epistemology for us; far from it.
20Miss Manners, treats this as evidence that etiquette facts are moral facts (Martin and Stent
1990). This, though, conflicts with the strong intuition that etiquette facts have only local force,
though it’s fair to say that many etiquette facts make overlap, in their content, with moral facts—
don’t offend! And many moral facts have as part of their content respect, which in turn implies we
ought to pay attention to etiquette. But the claim that all etiquette facts are moral is too much to
bear.
21See Woods (forthcoming, §10.3.1) for an explanation of why this is.
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Consider that the seemingly undeniable tendency to treat (at least some of) our
aesthetic judgments, especially judgments of mere taste, as sourced in our own
standpoints doesn’t undermine our application of these standards to ourselves. If
we understand Kant and Smith as saying that accepting relativism undermines
taking all normativity seriously, their claim is implausible. When we take a stan-
dard seriously, it plays a role for us in regulating our behavior, contingent or no.22
Maybe the claim is that it would be better if we believed our normative reasons
to be non-relative. But this is not at all obvious. Often the fact that my reasons
would change if I acted thusly seems intuitively explanatory of why I shouldn’t
act thusly; this not only is consistent with subjectivism, but seems to nearly pre-
suppose it.
A better thought is that normative facts hold not only for ourselves, but also for
others, regardless of whether they share our normative beliefs or not. Further, the
thought continues, this is part and parcel of why we engage in normative theoriz-
ing to begin with. Perhaps we should understand Kant and Smith as claiming that
the functional role of normative theorizing requires that we be able to criticize and
correct the actions of others. Lenman, discussing Smith, glosses what this might
mean:
If we came to see our moral commitments in this way we’d rightly
panic because we’d no longer be able to take seriously the idea of
disapproving of someone for failing to share them. (Lenman 1999,
166)
That a central part of the functional role of normative judgment includes disagree-
ment and evaluation of others seems true.23 It’d be difficult to come to grips with
a notion of normativity that didn’t allow us to bring our normative beliefs to bear
on each other in attempting to guide not only our own actions, but also the actions
of others.
22We can treat taking a formal standard seriously, roughly, in terms of us taking being out of
step with it as non-instrumentally undesirable. See Woods (2016, forthcoming) for details and
complications.
23I won’t address the full literature on disagreement in ethics and aesthetics. Since disagreement
is just one of several properties I think the subjectivists can accommodate with evaluative reasons,
I just sketch one way disagreement is possible. See Finlay (2014) and Ridge (2014, chapter 6) for
further accounts of disagreement for subjectivist and expressivist views which could be adapted to
my purpose here.
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We should be careful here though. Some normative standards clearly don’t work
this way. My judgment that it’s rude to expose my feet to others gives me no
reason to keep my shoes on in a Turkish household; their sense of it being rude
to object in class gives them no reason to behave deferentially in my classroom.
Quite the contrary. Different standards of etiquette apply in each case and we are
well aware that our behavior should change accordingly, at least when we think
carefully about it. That this isn’t the case with morality may be due to differences
in the functional role of our normative and our etiquette judgments.
So perhaps this is the essence of Kant and Smith’s point: we view normative rea-
sons as holding for others as well as ourselves; our evidence for this is our will-
ingness to bring such considerations to bear in our discussions with one another
about how we ought to act; and the explanation of this may, perhaps, be found in
the functional role of normative theorizing. Other potential aspects of the func-
tional role of normative theorizing includes evaluation of the reasons of others,
contentful disagreement about what to do, planing for what to do in hypothetical
situations, and evaluation of the reasons we’d have there. Reasonable subjectivist
views should capture these aspects of normative judgement’s functional role. As
I’ll show in the remainder of this essay, capturing these aspects does not require
the ontic universality of normativity—something far weaker will suffice. We will
now turn to the first aspect—evaluating the reasons of others.
5. Subjectivism and Criticizing Others
Consider again a particular form of aesthetic judgment, judgments of taste. It’s
commonly (and correctly) believed that tastes are relatively subjective. I am no
fan of chocolate; it’s bearable, but generally unremarkable. This is strange to
most people. Assessed from their gustatory standpoint, I have reasons to eat more
chocolate. “Assessed from their gustatory standpoint” here means evaluating what
gustatory reasons I have according to their tastes. The evaluative reasons I have,
from their standpoint, will differ from the evaluative reasons I have according to
my own gustatory standpoint. Plausibly, I’ve evaluative reason to eat chocolate
according to the average individual, but no ontic reason at all.
Consider likewise folks driving on the wrong side of the road. This is a joke—
kind of. The funny thing is that we really do feel like other folk drive on the
wrong side of the road, even though we know quite well that it’s entirely arbitrary
which side of the road a community drives on. The intuitive force of the approval
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of right-driving over left-driving remains, even when we know quite well that the
choice of side is arbitrary. Of course, this is quite irrational in a sense. We all
know full well that tastes differ between individuals and that my tastes give you
no reason to eat what I would eat were I to be in your shoes, but with my tongue.24
In other cases where we have explicitly subjective reactions, recognition of this
fact undermines claims to correctness and incorrectness.
. . . once we bring other perceptual systems into view, then provided
they are equally discriminatory, we lose any very robust attachment
to the idea that ours is right and theirs is wrong. ... People who taste
phenolthiourea the other way are not wrong, just different. But there
is no reason to suppose that this ambivalence extends similarly to the
case of value. (Blackburn 2006)
But I submit that many of us feel a drive to criticize the gustatory sensibility of oth-
ers even though we know full well that tastes are subjective—or, anyways, so my
experiences being a chocolate deviant suggest. Our actual gustatory standpoints
seem to include the idea that we are in a position to recommend someone eat
against what we know their tastes to be, to criticize their tastes for being bizarre,
and so on. And, in a sense, this is quite rational as tastes are plastic and, from your
point of view, chocolate really is delicious. Continued experience with a particu-
lar thing, be it chocolate or wine, tends to breed some taste for it, which from your
perspective is a valuable thing.25 Moreover, general convergence in our tastes is
useful and desirable—when deciding where to go for dinner. And we might want
ourselves, if we were to find ourselves in a position like mine, to go through the
pain of developing an affection for chocolate, at least as we now view that tragic
possibility.
The same explanation cannot be given for ontic aesthetic reasons. It’s irrational
tout court, not merely irrational in a sense, to think that we all have gustatory rea-
sons to eat chocolate when assessed from within our own gustatory perspective.
24Alex King suggests (personal communication) that I’m staking a lot on the subjective nature
of culinary norms and that perhaps the general aesthetic case, including more objective aspects
of the aesthetics of food, is different. The issue is difficult, but I only really need the gustatory
case for my point that we can use what seem obviously subjective normative standards to fill the
functional role that we need for putatively non-subjective ones like morality. Thanks also to her
for more general discussion of these issues.
25The general aesthetic case is more complicated, as can be seen by the results of Meskin et al
(2013).
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Some of us—ahem—do not. There is no gustatory reason for me to pursue the
modification of my desires that continued exposure to chocolate might provide.26
Typically, my only reasons to develop a taste for chocolate are prudential reasons
like not standing out or health benefits.
Yet this type of aesthetic irrationality is a pervasive feature of ordinary aesthetic
discourse. Someone who differs significantly enough from you aesthetically is
often thought to simply be mistaken about their own tastes, as if such a thing were
generally possible. But this is projection of some kind of mistaken universality
on a bit of our experience we know, on reflection, to be non-universal. Thus the
explanation of why we might hold onto ontic aesthetic universality doesn’t justify
holding on to it, unlike the case of evaluative aesthetic universality where aesthetic
norms evaluating others tastes negatively are coherent and socially useful.
As with aesthetic reasons, so with normative reasons. We can make sense of eval-
uative normative reasons and thereby evaluative normative universality. And the
reasons given above for evaluating the aesthetic reactions of others are even more
compelling in the normative case. If we are often willing to claim aesthetic rea-
sons hold for someone even when they clearly aren’t reachable from within their
aesthetic standpoint, even given that we know in our hearts how subjective tastes
are, it seems very plausible that we are willing to claim normative reasons hold
for someone else when they aren’t clearly reachable from within their normative
standpoint. Our normative standpoint need accept no restriction on our evaluation
of other’s actions, even when they clearly don’t share our norms.
Applying our normative notions to your actions yields a definite and sensible
verdict—even if it’s not obviously a verdict you should share.27 It’s here that
we find the truth in Smith’s idea that viewing our own perspectives as arbitrary
would undermine them. If we viewed our reasons as holding evaluatively only for
us or those with nigh-identical norms, then we’d be hard pressed to make sense of
the role of normative reasons in evaluating others; a role which is clearly part of
our actual normative practice. Luckily, since exertion of social pressure by means
of explicit normative pronouncement is reasonably effective as a tool of social co-
ordination, even of those with divergent norms, there’s good reason to evaluate
26Of course, there might be “taste-directed” non-gustatory reasons (akin to “truth-directed” non-
epistemic reasons) to do so since I might get to enjoy more tastes I otherwise enjoy were I to love
chocolate more.
27Consider the similar discussion of defined notions of evaluation in (Schafer 2014a).
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others.28
I’ve argued that we can reasonably evaluate others actions by means of our own
norms even when we know that our norms differ by analogizing it with a clearly
subjective set of evaluative judgments: aesthetic judgments. But there remains
the question of how to understand our frequent engagement in explicit argument
with others about normative matters and our attempts to convince them to modify
their normative standpoints. Evaluation is one thing; reasonable hashing out of
normative difference another.
If someone’s normative or aesthetic standpoint is significantly different from ours,
this practice might seem pointless. De gustibus non est disputandum, after all.
Yet, we dispute about taste all the time.29 So we have to explain why would we
do such a thing if our normative standpoints aren’t ontically universal. We turn to
this now.
6. How Subjectivists Should Disagree
In order to address this question, it’s useful to set aside a class of cases where
normative disagreement doesn’t make sense. If someone has a coherent and deep
commitment to a normative standpoint radically different from ours, then dispute
can be pointless. Of course, as mentioned above, this does not mean that we can’t
evaluate their actions according to our own normative standpoints and that, in an
important sense, it’s totally reasonable to do so. But actually locking horns with
them about their perverted norms doesn’t really make sense.30
This echoes Ayer’s (1946) neglected discussion of moral argumentation. He ana-
lyzes moral argumentation as proposing various “deeper” commitments until our
interlocutor latches onto one of them. Punching him is okay?; Well, do you think
hurting people is fine?; Oh, do you think causing pain unnecessarily is fine? and
so on. Ayer suggests that if this procedure does not work, or if we don’t uncover
false non-normative beliefs in the process, we tend to abandon the argument. Sim-
28(Manne 2014) also suggests similar justification for persisting in offering reasons to others
even if our offerings won’t have uptake for them.
29I’ve always preferred the punny rendition of the phrase in English anyway. There’s no ac-
counting for taste is a nice way to express that one searches in vain for why someone likes lettuce.
30Compare the discussion of the pointlessness of discussion with “the others” in (Lenman 2014,
243).
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ilarly, if we can see in advance it won’t work, then it seems unreasonable to start
arguing with someone at all.31
Ayer neglects the role of argument in irrational change of belief—we can bring
people to agreement by applying argumentative peer pressure. Sometimes this is
even reasonable.32 But, when someone has suitably robust views and a suitably
argumentative nature, it may be pointless to disagree:
Suppose...I am trying to convince a man who is nasty to his wife to
treat her more nicely, or with more consideration. In this endeavor, I
repeatedly press my concerns on him, and in a variety of ways. Fi-
nally, he says to me—borrowing Williams’ wording here—“I don’t
care. Don’t you understand? I really do not care.” That is, he doesn’t
care directly about treating his wife more nicely. Nor does he care
about any of the goods which would be promoted or instantiated by
so doing....
Here’s the intuition I have, and want to invite you to share, now: when
we learn that this man cannot be motivated to lift his game merely
by continuing to carry on with the conversation, something has now
changed in the normative and dialogical space between us. (Manne
2014, 102–103)
Manne’s point is that when there’s really no common ground for rational conver-
sation, the only reason remaining to argue is browbeating one’s interlocutor into
moral compliance.33 Our normative standpoints differ to simply too large a degree.
Thankfully, such cases are relatively rare; we can put them aside. In better cases
when our interlocutor is reasonable—to borrow Manne’s expression, when they
are open to ‘rational’ discussion—then we presume overlap in our beliefs about
what considerations normatively matter. It’s plausible that such overlap is required
to make sense of rational discussion at all.34
31Though, as Jimmy Lenman usefully reminded me, the situation is more complicated in prac-
tice. We might, for instance, be performing our argument for an audience.
32See also Street (2009) and Sobel (2014) for this point.
33Manne is concerned with cases where motivational internalism fails, but the point generalizes.
34See Lenman (2014) for related arguments to the effect that the whole point of normative
communication — at least in typical and important cases — is to come to convergence in our
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Carballo and Santorio (2016), for example, argue that for rational communication
about normative matters to have a point, both participants must take as part of the
presupposed common ground that:
• there are potential norms we might accept—where such norms are either
derivative or fundamental—which are not ruled out in advance of each other
by either party
• the participants ought to come to some convergence.35
These conditions are generalizations of the typical Stalnakarian account of com-
munication, so we needn’t even invoke anything special in understanding norma-
tive communication. We can thus understand communication about normative
matters in terms of coming to agree on norms or attitudes we can share and use-
fully apply in planning our actions and evaluating the world around us.36 If this
is right—and I suspect it is—then we should assume that our typical interlocutors
share some part of our normative standpoint or, at a minimum, a set of commit-
ments about how to go about improving our norms.37
Restricting our norms to these overlapping sections of our normative standpoints,
there is a reason for someone to do something by my lights (there’s ontic reason
to do something) if and only if there is a reason for them to do it by yours. By
arguing about normative matters with the aim to coordinate, we are sometimes
putting forth factual claims about what reasons exist in the shared background
and sometimes proposing to extend this shared background by adding norms to
normative standpoints. As Lenman rightly stresses, this point is easily satisfied in principle, even
if far too infrequently in practice.
35They go on to argue that both participants should agree that there is a unique convergence
point, but this is overly strong for subjectivist views. If this were true, however, it would just make
my point all the stronger.
36Finlay (2009 §7.1) argues compellingly that participants to such conversations often do pre-
suppose overlap in normative outlook (in his terms, shared ends). This strengthens the point that
normative argumentation does and should proceed in a sensible way even if subjectivism is true.
He goes on to suggest—as I did above—that even when such presuppositions are false, they’re
useful to maintain. Williams (1995) similarly glosses the phenomenon in terms of launching our
normative assertions into the mass of humanity with the optimistic hope that they’ll find purchase
in our interlocutors. See also Lenman (2014) for further discussion.
37Of course, this latter is simply another part of a normative standpoint, but it’s useful to
highlight that we can get on with normative communication if we either share norms or certain
“metanorms” about how to revise norms (for instance, by sharing a common conception of what
moral evidence consists in) . Thanks to Pekka Va¨yrynen for discussion.
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the common ground and making the appropriate modifications to one’s overall
normative standpoint. Since the shared background will typically be a mere frag-
ment of our overall normative standpoint, which may or may not be complete,
accepting the proposal of our interlocutor will often involve retracting or modify-
ing some fragment of our normative standpoint.
Here are two examples. Suppose neither you nor I take a stand on whether
third-trimester abortions are permissible, but we agree (a) about many of the non-
normative details, (b) that pain and suffering is bad, we’ve reasons to avoid taking
life, etc, and (c) that we’ve reason to make our view more coherent and natural
when possible. You propose that we’ve reasons to avoid third-trimester abortions
on grounds that fetuses are well-developed by that point and the likelihood of suf-
fering is non-negligible. I accept this claim, add it into the common ground, and
thereby expand the overlap of our normative standpoints.
Now, suppose that the case is as above, but I think we’ve reasons to avoid third-
trimester abortions and you disagree. I propose as before, suggesting that if you
accept b, you should—on abductive grounds—accept that we’ve reasons to avoid
third-trimester abortions. You come to accept that we have reasons to avoid third-
trimester abortions, retracting your earlier view.
If our communication about normative matters looks like this, then we do not need
ontic or even evaluative universality to make sense of normative communication,
or anyways, the normative communication that actually matters. All we need is
presupposition of significant overlap in our normative standpoints.
Presuppositions may be false; there may be less overlap in our normative stand-
points than we hope. But the more atypical the case, the more pointless it will
seem to engage in rational discussion instead of engaging in browbeating, the ex-
ertion of social and peer pressure, and the like. Harkening back to the opening
remarks from Foot, Street, and Stroud, those who share none of our normative
standpoint38 seem inhuman and alien, unlike our typical conversational partners.
Since all we need in the presumption of overlap (on both parts), and this follows
38As above, they must also fail to share common principles for improvement of sensibilities
(where there’s common views of evidence for what constitutes improvement), beliefs about the
functional role of normative judgment, etc. This hedge being noted, the idea is clear enough. To
be honest, I think we reach incomprehension easier than this, but I want to be ecumenical or, at
least, as ecumenical as I can stomach.
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from viewing our conversational partners as relatively like us, there’s good reason
to think that normative communication, even for subjectivists, is obviously pos-
sible and plausibly pervasive. We turn now to addressing a related aspect of the
functional role of normative judgment: hypothetical planning.
7. Subjectivism and Hypothetical Planning
We often consider hypothetical and counterfactual situations to prospectively plan
what we should do—to test and hone in our actual reasons (Gibbard 1990). We
might want ontic universality here since we want our garnered knowledge to bear
on analogous circumstances we might actually face. We want both that the rea-
sons on which we’d then act would be genuine reasons for action as well as our
testing of general reasons would be guaranteed by ontic universality.
As Schafer (2014) notes, we use this kind of reasoning all the time:
Nothing is more natural or more common than for us to consider
someone’s situation and to form some hypothetical plan for action
for the situation in question. For example, suppose I... find myself
wondering what I “would have done” had I been in Napoleon’s shoes.
When I ask myself this question, I am not asking myself a descrip-
tive question concerning what someone with my psychology would
have done in that situation. Rather, I am asking myself what to do in
such a situation. In other words, I am forming a hypothetical plan for
action...(Schafer 2014b)
But there is a worry here: why bother forming a plan for what I would do in
Napoleon’s shoes as I’ll never be there, and I’ll never share his norms?39 Even
less the norms of Caligula or Elizabeth Ba´thory. What role do these bizarre hy-
pothetical plans play in my actual plans for situations I’ll encounter? Perhaps our
pure reasons should be treated as ontically universal if this kind of hypothetical
planning need inform our actual decisions; but since many of the problematic sit-
uations seem to do no such thing, it’s hard to see why we should require ontic
universality.
39See also Finlay (2014 §8.6) on weird consequences of Gibbard’s account of hypothetical
planning.
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Of course, it can be reasonable to evaluate Napoleon’s situation by our norms.
To be sure, it would make more sense for a general to engage in an evaluative
judgment about what Napoleon should do than it would for most of us, but the
point is the same. It’s reasonable to evaluate what we—people with our normative
sensibilities—would do in similar situations. This doesn’t give us much reason to
think that ontic evaluation of Napoleon’s situation is anything more than a curios-
ity. What would the fact that Caligula has ontic reason to plan a massacre tell us
about what we’d have reason to do in a similar situation?
The regulative role of considering ontic reasons in bizarre abstract hypothetical
situations is thus much less important that it initially seemed.40 Moreover, it’s
doubtful that the anti-subjectivist intuitions about such situations usually bandied
about are clearly probative. Imagining the full normative outlook of Parfit’s Future
Tuesday Indifferent, for example, (someone who only prospectively cares only
about non-Tuesday pain) seems nigh impossible, so our intuitions aren’t clearly
probative—plausibly we’re importing our norms illicitly in claiming they have
reason to avoid pain on future Tuesdays. Obviously such a situation is then ir-
rational, but it’s irrational since there’s internal conflict between the norms and
desires we’re illicitly importing and those part of the stipulated example.
This point should remind us again of Wittgenstein’s Woodsellers and how difficult
it is to understand their way of counting, especially when we’ve only considered
how they measure wood. The point is not that we cannot make out how they
measure wood; it’s understanding how it integrates into an overall system of mea-
suring and the role of counting in various aspects of our lives. Measuring wood
by area is tantamount to throwing out everything we know about measuring. It’s
entirely alien to us. As with wood, so with reasons.
Why, then, is it so natural and easy for us to pass seemingly ontic judgment in
such counteractual cases? Presumably, it’s because our judgments about what we
ought to do in Caligula’s shoes are informed by the gross majority of our nor-
mative sensibilities and we assume that Caligula, different as he is, nevertheless
shares many of our norms. Again, it’s very plausible that there is broad and per-
40This is true for morality and normativity generally, but not clearly true for other “when in
Rome” systems of norms like those of fashion, aesthetics, and etiquette. There it seems much
more important to consider what our reasons would be in that context instead of what we think,
from outside, the reasons they have are. Still, and crucially, we don’t need ontic universality for
this. Thanks to Catharine Diehl for discussion.
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vasive overlap between any conceivable normative outlook. Maybe it seems okay
to cross against the light and shoplift from large chain stores to me and not to you,
but random stabbings and complete and explicit disregard for others41 are out.
And asking ourselves the question of what we’d do in Caligula’s shoes plausibly
presupposes this.
Something like this underlies Foot’s famous observation:
But it’s interesting that the people of Leningrad were not similarly
struck by the thought that only the contingent fact that other citi-
zens shared their loyalty and devotion to the city stood between them
and the Germans during the terrible years of the siege. Perhaps we
should be less troubled than we are by fear of defection from the
moral cause. . .
They were not struck by this exactly because it would be relatively inhuman to
have no loyalty and devotion to one’s city, family, and friends; it seems literally
inconceivable that this could be a pervasive feature of our fellows. We accept that
not everyone shares our sensibilities, but looking through the eyes of those who
do not seems rather difficult. Again, where even to start?
We might thus mistake Caligula’s evaluative reasons (roughly corresponding to
what we would do in similar circumstances) for ontic reasons. Given the pre-
supposition that we enjoy broad overlap in sensibility and normative outlook,
the questions come to largely the same.42 So it’s no surprise that we’d mistake
the evaluative reasons Caligula has to avoid massacre-planning for ontic reasons.
There’s thus not much cause for worry that subjectivism delivers the wrong ver-
dict on these situations;43 such intuitions are plausibly based on illicit readings of
the cases.
If something more precise is desired, we could put the upshot this way. We need
only Human universality (writing c ∼h d for d a context similar to ours in the
conventions, psychologies, and behaviors of the agents within):
〈c, n〉 |= hR(a, γ, ϕ) if and only if ∀c
′[a, γ ∈ c′ ∧ c′ ∼h c ⇒ 〈c
′, nc′〉 |= R(a, γ, ϕ)]
41See Street’s (2005) discussion of the rational social insect.
42Note that this means that evaluative reasons are enough even for non-subjectivist accounts of
hypothetical planning, so we haven’t lost anything here by our subjectivism.
43I won’t explicitly list the many heralds of this mistake, though the reader won’t struggle hard
to find them.
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for normative judgments to play the role in organizing our actual behavior that
Gibbard and Schafer suggest. That is, we only need that our reasons are the same
in any human contexts, contexts more or less similar to ours.44 And no reasonable
subjectivist position needs to force us to believe normativity is not humanly uni-
versal. Intuitions to the contrary can be explained away by a combination of Foot’s
observation about humanity and Stroud’s observation about perverse method of
underexplicated cases. We now turn discussing one last aspect of normative judg-
ment, one which generalizes Smith and Kant’s point from above and continues the
point that our intuitions about counter-normative contexts aren’t probative.
8. Counternormative Counterfactuals
The following counternormative conditional seems false:
If local moral conventions demanded random cruelty, I would have
strong reason to be cruel
We seem not to have strong reasons for being randomly cruel, whether or not our
local conventions endorse it.45 But, since we have distinguished two senses of
universality, we should also distinguish two senses of these conditionals.46 We
can distinguish the evaluative normative counterfactual conditional:
〈c, n〉 |= ϕe ψ iff in the closest circumstance c
′ in which 〈c′, n〉 |= ϕ, 〈c′, n〉 |= ψ
from the ontic normative counterfactual conditional
〈c, n〉 |= ϕo ψ iff in the closest circumstance c
′ in which 〈c′, nc′〉 |= ϕ, 〈c
′, n〉 |= ψ
So long as we do not have as a part of our normative standpoint that the con-
ventions of people matter for whether they have reasons for what they do—and
most subjectivist views endorse no such thing—then the closest contexts in which
people approve of random cruelty is one where random cruelty is wrong. So the
44Note that this is a restriction of ontic, not evaluative, universality. We can still have full bore
evaluative universality in tandem with ontic universality; in fact, I think this is more or less the
usual situation for a suitable precisification of ‘human’.
45Modulo lightweight reasons that arise from distinct contexts, like promising to be cruel. I am
committed elsewhere to the view that such reasons exist, but are nearly always outweighed. See
Woods (2016, forthcoming).
46I work with a Lewis-style “variably-strict” analysis of counterfactuals here for simplicity
(Lewis 1973). My point can be generalized across a range of analyses of counterfactuals.
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evaluative counternormative is false.
Is this enough to downplay the intuition that such conditionals are intuitively
false? It ought to be. It’s entirely unclear why we’d think that the ontic coun-
ternormative is obviously false. But I fear that this will be insufficient to convince
most people, so let me offer another consideration. Many of ontic counternorma-
tives are also false even given subjectivism. Consider the closest possible world in
which kicking dogs is endorsed by our normative standpoint, but where we don’t
have massively false beliefs about animals.47 What would such a world be like?
Our disapproval of kicking dogs is grounded in our empathy towards animals, the
intimate role dogs play in our lives, that kicking them causes pain, etc. This sits
badly with approval of kicking dogs. So the nearest world in which kicking dogs
is smiled upon is one falsifying one of these facts. Perhaps dogs there enjoy being
kicked. In that context, it’s not clear that kicking dogs is bad.48
Suppose, now, that we do not feel any empathy towards animals. We have two
types of cases. First, we might leave the rest of our psychology alone. But given
the resulting massive incoherence in our psychologies, such a world will be very
different from ours. Sympathetic reasons to avoid randomly cruelty, after all, are
more or less normative bedrock. Given this, the above point about dog-kicking
applies. A world where we endorse dog-kicking with no deeper explanation is so
far away that it’s not relevant for evaluation of the counternormative.49
Suppose instead that we make the requisite changes in the rest of our psychology.
Then, as in the last section, I submit that our intuitive judgments about ontic rea-
sons aren’t probative. Imagine what it would be like to have a psychology approv-
ing of something like serious random cruelty without assuming some massively
mistaken set of beliefs about the world. I’m guessing that you can’t; I definitely
cannot. This, I believe, underlies why it’s so difficult to even portray a seriously
deranged character (say, in a show like Dexter); the tendency to “humanize” them
47In general, we need to be careful here about instrumental norms and information. For ex-
ample, if our anti-dog-kicking norm is grounded in more basic norm of avoiding causing pain to
feeling creatures, then false beliefs about dogs being feeling creatures will explain why we endorse
dog-kicking. Still, we would have ontic reason to avoid kicking dogs since they, in fact, are feeling
creatures.
48For more discussion of counterconventional conditionals, see Einheuser (2006).
49Of course, you can freeze this condition into the prejacent of the counternormative, but eval-
uating such complex prejacent-ed conditionals is extremely fraught.
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is nearly immediate.
So there are three interlocking responses to intuitive “false” judgments about
counternormative conditionals. First, we might be mistaking our evaluative re-
action for an ontic one. Evaluatively, our reaction is totally apt. Second, we might
be mistaking ontic reaction for one case for an ontic reaction to a different case—
the case of a group differing from us in this particular, but agreeing on nearly every
other part of our normative standpoint. But such cases are too remote to play a
role in the truth or falsity of the counternormative. Finally, we might be treating
our reaction to the case just described as our reaction to the case of someone with
a coherent, but inhuman, psychology. But such intuitions aren’t probative, as I’ve
argued above.
So counternormatives pose no real problem. The relevant evaluative counternor-
matives are typically false, and, for ontic counternormatives, once we’ve disentan-
gled what they really are, we can see that our intuitive reactions aren’t probative.
Given this, we cannot assume that they’re false without begging questions against
the subjectivist.
9. Conclusion
I have distinguished and defined two separate notions of normative universality—
ontic and evaluative universality—and argued that even though subjectivism de-
nies ontic universality, this does not undermine normative judgment playing its
usual functional role. Evaluative universality suffices to make sense of evaluating
the reasons of others, significant overlap in our reasons suffices to make sense
of normative disagreement and evaluating hypothetical cases, and the resulting
types of counterfactuals are unproblematic—the relevant evaluative counternor-
mative counterfactuals are false, as should be expected, ontic counternormative
counterfactuals are either false, unworrisome, or our intuitions about them are not
probative.
At this point, it might be worried that there are real life cases of repulsive moral
behavior. All too true. But charity demands that we should try as hard as pos-
sible to see the culprits as not making moral errors, but factual ones. When we
cannot find such errors, we should look for swamping beliefs—such as religious,
cultural, or capitalist convictions that cut against human empathy—or mistakes of
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reason arising from mistaken application of beliefs to norms.50 And when both of
these fail, only then should we look to see what sort of affective or moral differ-
ence would explain why we and they have such differing normative outlooks. If
this procedure is reasonable, as I hope and pray it is, then plausibly we generally
presuppose that others are relatively like us.
When we cannot so explain grotesque behavior, it seems to me that we are in a
position to these folks as we are to people who approve of random cruelty on alter-
nating Wednesdays. It’s very difficult to understand how someone could willingly
throw adulterers off of high towers without presuming that they believe some-
thing that’s simply false. This normative outlook is not just different from ours;
it’s more or less incomprehensible. Or, anyways, so I find it. And, judging by
how often people react to immoral behavior with expressions like “I simply don’t
understand how you could think that”, I and my fellow subjectivists are not alone
in this.
Even when we can make sense of evaluating the reasons of someone from a dif-
fering perspective, it by no means follows that we should take such evaluations
seriously or afford them the role that our assessments of reasons typically plays
in attributions of punitive actions like blame and criticism. That’s a non-obvious
normative claim. Likewise, it’s not obvious that we should revise our tendencies
to accept norms demanding evaluative normative universality, just as it’s not ob-
vious that we should revise our tendencies to accept norms demanding evaluative
aesthetic universality. These tendencies play a useful prudential role in facilitat-
ing coordination, one which would be hampered by being overly tolerant of the
viewpoints of others.
On balance, the assumption that normative facts are ontically universal is on shaky
footing. If there’s an argument here, it won’t come from subjectivism interfer-
ing with the functional role of normative judgment. Without begging questions
against a subjectivist point of view, it’s unlikely to come from anywhere. This is
not to say that there aren’t other reasons to reject subjectivism. But the putative
ontic universality of normative facts is not one of them. This fact seems to me to
significantly strengthen the already quite considerable case in favor of subjectivist
views of normativity.
50See Sobel (2014) for useful discussion of the role of mistaken beliefs in explicating seemingly
immoral and amoral behaviors.
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